Este artículo se centra en uno de los resultados de los movimientos asamblearios de 2010: la estrategia electoral de presentarse a las elecciones municipales para canalizar el poder del ayuntamiento hacia una asamblea popular que reúna a los vecinos de la ciudad. Aunque esta estrategia fue inicialmente desarrollada por el pensador estadounidense Murray Bookchin con el fin de crear una sociedad comunalista -es decir, una sociedad en la que el poder público sea ejercido por el pueblo reunido a nivel local-, (...) se ha practicado sobre el terreno en los últimos años. Sin embargo, los movimientos que la adoptan se enfrentan a un vacío jurídico y político. Basándose en un extenso trabajo de campo, el artículo pretende llenar este vacío examinando el diseño institucional derivado de la adopción de esta estrategia por parte del movimiento de los Chalecos Amarillos en Commercy. Más concretamente, muestra cómo el movimiento reinventó la relación de representación entre el ayuntamiento y el pueblo reunido mediante mandatos imperativos. (shrink)

Two types of truth table tasks are used investigating mental representations of conditionals: a possibilities-based and a truth-based one. In possibilities tasks, participants indicate whether a situation is possible or impossible according to the conditional rule. In truth tasks participants evaluate whether a situation makes the rule true or false, or is irrelevant with respect to the truth of the rule. Comparing the two-option version of the possibilities task with the truth task in Experiment 1, the possibilities task yields logical (...) answer patterns whereas the truth task yields defective patterns. Adding the irrelevant option to the possibilities task in Experiment 2 leads to a considerable amount of defective patterns in the possibilities task, but still to more logical patterns in the possibilities task than in the truth task. Experiment 3 shows that directionality matters since rule-to-situation tasks yield more logical answer patterns than do situation-to-rule tasks. We conclude that both task types are not comparable as such since wording, number of options and directionality influence the results. (shrink)

The essays appearing in these two volumes are based on Keynote and State-of-the-Art Lectures delivered at the XXVth International Congress of Psychology, in Brussels, July 1992. The Brussels Congress was the latest in a series of conferences which are organized at regular intervals under the auspices of the International Union of Psychological Science, the main international organization in the field of Scientific Psychology. The first of those meetings took place in Paris in 1889. An important function of the International Congresses (...) is to promote communication between different specializations in Psychology. Speakers were therefore asked to present lectures and discussions in their own fields of study, in a way that would be accessible to fellow psychologists active in other fields. State-of-the-Art lecturers were specifically asked to prepare a tutorial review on a topic which, in the view of the Program Committee, had recently given rise to particularly important developments. These contributions are included in Volume Two. Keynote lecturers were left free to address whatever subject they felt was of greatest interest. The chapters in Volume 1 are preceded by the Presidential Address by Mark R. Rosenzweig. (shrink)

"Under the auspices of the International Union of Psychological Science.".

From the reviews: "A good textbook can improve a lecture course enormously, especially when the material of the lecture includes many technical details. Van Dalen's book, the success and popularity of which may be suspected from this steady interest in it, contains a thorough introduction to elementary classical logic in a relaxed way, suitable for mathematics students who just want to get to know logic. The presentation always points out the connections of logic to other parts of mathematics. The reader (...) immediately see the logic is "just another branch of mathematics" and not something more sacred." Acta Scientiarum Mathematicarum, Hungary. (shrink)

Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers’ attempt to use adaptionist evolutionary psychology (...) to solve the third puzzle (existence). Third, I sketch a theory to replace that of Trivers. Self-deception is not an adaptation, but a spandrel in the sense that Gould and Lewontin give the term: a byproduct of other features of human (cognitive) architecture.Self-deception is so undeniable a fact of human life that if anyone tried to deny its existence, the proper response would be to accuse this person of it. (Allen Wood, Citation 1988 ). (shrink)

This paper claims that the standard characterization of the motivational role of belief should be supplemented. Beliefs do not only, jointly with desires, cause and rationalize actions that will satisfy the desires, if the beliefs are true; beliefs are also the practical ground of other cognitive attitudes, like imagining, which means beliefs determine whether and when one acts with those other attitudes as the cognitive inputs into choices and practical reasoning. In addition to arguing for this thesis, I take issue (...) with Velleman's argument that belief and imagining cannot be distinguished on the basis of motivational role. (shrink)

We present a meta-analytic review on the processing of negations in conditional reasoning about affirmation problems (Modus Ponens: “MP”, Affirmation of the Consequent “AC”) and denial problems (Denial of the Antecedent “DA”, and Modus Tollens “MT”). Findings correct previous generalisations about the phenomena. First, the effects of negation in the part of the conditional about which an inference is made, are not constrained to denial problems. These inferential-negation effects are also observed on AC. Second, there generally are reliable effects of (...) a negation in the clause referred to by the categorical premise, and these referred-negation effects are constrained to the logically fallacious AC and DA inferences. All findings are presented and discussed in relation to contemporary mental model (MM) and mental logic (ML) theories. It is argued that a double-negation elimination hypothesis provides a sufficient explanation of inferential-negation effects within both MM theory and ML theory, if the latter is extended by a validating search for counter examples. Both MM and ML theories adhere to a processing scheme that allows them to incorporate an account of referred-negation effects based on the thesis that counter-example frequency is modulated by the scope of a contrast class delineated by a false affirmative. We conclude that MM and ML theories provide adequate processing schemes to accommodate for the explanatory hypotheses, at least in principle. In practice, both approaches remain equivocal as regards the connectivity and interactivity with long-term memory knowledge invoked in generating, manipulating, and testing the mental representations of negative state of affairs. (shrink)

In certain contexts reasoners reject instances of the valid Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inference form in conditional arguments. Byrne (1989) observed this suppression effect when a conditional premise is accompanied by a conditional containing an additional requirement. In an earlier study, Rumain, Connell, and Braine (1983) observed suppression of the invalid inferences "the denial of the antecedent" and "the affirmation of the consequent" when a conditional premise is accompanied by a conditional containing an alternative requirement. Here we present three (...) experiments showing that the results of Byrne (1989) and Rumain et al. (1983) are influenced by the answer procedure. When reasoners have to evaluate answer alternatives that only deal with the inferences that can be made with respect to the first conditional, then suppression is observed (Experiment 1). However, when reasoners are also given answer alternatives about the second conditional (Experiment 2) no suppression is observed. Moreover, contrary to the hypothesis of Byrne (1989), at least some of the reasoners do not combine the information of the two conditionals and do not give a conclusion based on the combined premise. Instead, we hypothesise that some of the reasoners have reasoned in two stages. In the first stage, they form a putative conclusion on the basis of the first conditional and the categorical premise, and in the second stage, they amend the putative conclusion in the light of the information in the second premise. This hypothesis was confirmed in Experiment 3. Finally, the results are discussed with respect to the mental model theory and reasoning research in general. (shrink)

The missionary work of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika in theory and practice: in the past, present and futureIn this article a short survey is given of the missionary work, both in theory and practice, of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk during the last fifty years. There is also an indication that the Church has reached a crucial point which is going to require thorough rethinking and reconsideration of our missionary work.